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Abstract
This paper shows that public provision of private goods may be justi￿ed on pure e¢ ciency
grounds in an environment where individuals consume both public and private goods. The
government￿ s involvement in the provision of private goods provides it with information about
individuals￿ private good purchases that facilitates more e¢ cient revenue extraction for the
provision of public goods. We show that public provision of the private good improves economic
e¢ ciency under a condition that is always ful￿lled under stochastic independence and satis￿ed
for an open set of joint distributions. Our model is an example where there is an e¢ ciency loss
from separating revenue and expenditure problems, and is therefore of more general interest for
the study of optimal taxation.
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All governments in developed countries not only provide public goods, but also devote con-
siderable resources to the provision of private goods such as health care, housing, day care and
education. This paper provides a novel e¢ ciency rationale for such public provision of private
goods, based on ideas from the literature on commodity bundling.
We model the government as a benevolent social planner who seeks to maximize the expected
social surplus in an economy where citizens value a (binary) excludable public good, a (binary)
private good, and where utility can be transferred using a perfectly divisible commodity called
￿money.￿The key friction is that citizens￿valuations for the private and public goods are their
private information. Accordingly, we require that the government restrict attention to provision
mechanisms that are incentive compatible. In addition, we impose budget balance and individual
rationality constraints.
We consider the optimal mechanism under two cases that di⁄er in whether the government can
keep track of individuals￿purchases of the private good and use that information in constructing
fees and access rules for the public good.
As a benchmark, we consider what we call the ￿separate provision￿ case, under which the
planner designs provision mechanisms for the public and private goods separately. It is useful to
imagine this as a setup where two government agencies are separately in charge of the public and
private good provisions, even though they share a single budget constraint. The key restriction is
that the two agencies are not allowed to share information about an individual￿ s purchase in the
other agency, otherwise any feasible provision mechanism can be used. In this case, the mechanism
design problem simpli￿es to a problem where the planner sets an access fee for the public good,
a provision probability of the public good, and a price for the private good. The solution to this
problem has a ￿ avor of Ramsey pricing, and the price of the private good is always set above its
marginal cost of production. This is because the public good is generally under-provided due to
the informational constraints, implying that a su¢ ciently small ￿tax￿on the private good (which is
the wedge between the the marginal cost for the private good and its price) leads to a second-order
e¢ ciency loss in the private good market, but generates a ￿rst-order e¢ ciency gain due to the
increased probability of public good provision. A similar logic also delivers a less obvious result.
There should always be a strictly positive access fee for the public good, thus a set of types with
strictly positive measure will be excluded from usage. Moreover, we show that whenever the public
good is desirable in a ￿rst-best world, it will be provided with positive probability in the optimal
1separate provision mechanism, with some of its cost covered by the ￿taxes￿ collected from the
private goods.
The separate provision case is then contrasted with what we refer to as the ￿joint provision￿
case, where we allow the social planner to use all available information for decisions on both goods.
The key di⁄erence from the separate provision case is that here a single government agency is in
charge of the provision of both the public and private goods, and this agency can therefore condition
the pricing and access rules for the public good on information revealed in the private good market.
We are primarily interested in the qualitative question of whether joint provision mechanisms can
improve expected social welfare over the optimal separate provision mechanisms.
The multidimensional nature of the joint provision mechanism design problem prevents us
from characterizing the optimal joint provision mechanism. As a result, we follow McAfee et
al. (1989) and consider ￿local deviations￿ from the optimal separate provision mechanism we
earlier characterized. We show that, under some conditions, there always exists a joint provision
mechanism that improves upon the optimal separate provision mechanism in a subspace of the
feasible joint provision mechanisms. The particular subspace we consider consists of mechanisms
fully characterized by three ￿xed prices, one for the private good, one for the public good, and
one for the bundle consisting of both goods. Within this restricted set of feasible joint provision
mechanisms, we provide a su¢ cient conditions for when there exist mechanisms in which the price
of the private good an individual pays depends on whether she also consumes the public good that
generate a higher social welfare than the optimal separate provision mechanism.1 Importantly, our
su¢ cient condition is ful￿lled under stochastic independence between the valuations of the two
goods, and thus satis￿ed by an open set of joint distributions.
The above result can be interpreted as a new e¢ ciency rationale for the public provision of
private goods. The justi￿cation for such an interpretation is that in order to implement such a
pricing policy, it is necessary that the planner keeps track of which individuals purchase the private
good and somehow tax them on the basis of whether they also consume the public good. One
practical way to achieve this is to allow all agents who opt into (by paying taxes) the ￿government
bundle￿access to both the private and the public good, while those who only want to consume the
private good pay a separate and di⁄erent price for the private good alone. This is consistent with
1It is well-known from Adams and Yellen (1976) and McAfee et al. (1989) that bundling can increase revenue for
a multiproduct monopolist. Fang and Norman (2008) showed that it can also improve social welfare for the case of
multiple public good provision. The current paper extends this intuition further to the case of bundling public and
private goods.
2some important features of local public ￿nance in the U.S.: ￿rst, residents who pay property taxes
can enjoy the services, many of which has the nature of private goods (e.g., public schools), provided
by the local government ￿for free￿ ; second, most public universities charge di⁄erent amounts of
tuition for in-state or out-of-state residents.2
Our paper makes two major contributions to the existing literature on why it may be desirable
to provide certain private goods publicly.3 First, the role played by public provision of private
goods in our paper di⁄ers substantially from explanations emphasized in the existing literature. In
our paper, the government is involved in the provision of private goods because such involvement
provides it with information of the private good demands of the individuals, which in turns allows
the social planner to more e¢ ciently extract revenues for the provision of public goods. This
explanation has more in common with the literature on commodity bundling than the previous
literature. In particular, we depart from all existing e¢ ciency based explanations in that we do not
rely on preferences for redistribution. This feature of our model is particularly desirable because
several important publicly-provided private goods have neutral or regressive distributional e⁄ects.
Second, our paper imposes considerably less restrictions than the existing literature on the set
of admissible policies in establishing our results. The benchmark outcome we use for comparison is
the outcome that can be implemented under the optimal separate provision mechanism; this is in
stark contrast to the existing literature where the benchmark outcome is often derived under various
implicit restrictions on the market operations. The joint provision mechanism that improves upon
the benchmark outcome in our model does require that consumers cannot engage in arbitrage. This
restriction, however, seems reasonably descriptive of many publicly-provided private goods that we
see in reality. For example, in-state college tuition, public health insurance, day care and public
schools are all commodities that are di¢ cult to resell, thus limiting arbitrage. This is important
because our model thus also provides an explanation of why some, but not all, private goods are
publicly provided.
Our analysis also illustrates a more general point, which is of relevance for the literature on
optimal taxation and the traditional division of public economics into taxation and expenditure as
separate sub￿elds. Since Ramsey (1927), it has been standard in the optimal taxation literature to
ask how to best raise a given target revenue without considering what the tax revenue is intended
2In our setup, the in-state tuition can be interpreted as the price of the private good (college education) for those
who also purchase public good; and out-of-state tuition is the price for those who purchase the private good alone.
3We review the existing literature on the public provision of private goods in Section 2.
3for. Our model is a simple yet plausible example where this standard approach is no longer valid,
since the most e¢ cient way to distribute and ￿nance the public good in our model must be jointly
determined.4 In other words, the optimal commodity tax to ￿nance the (excludable) public good
depends on whether the consumer gets access to the public good. Hence, the analytically convenient
dichotomy between government expenditures and revenue comes with an e¢ ciency loss.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature
on the public provision of private goods; Section 3 presents the model; Section 4 characterizes the
optimal separate provision mechanism; Section 5 presents our main results regarding the optimality
of public provision of private goods; and ￿nally Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
It is useful to divide the existing literature on public provision of private goods into three
strands. The ￿rst strand, as represented by Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) and Epple and Romano
(1996), is a positive theory of the public provision of private goods driven by political economy
considerations.5 Epple and Romano (1996) consider a political economy model where the level of
a private good (say, ￿health care￿ ) and whether private purchases are permitted to supplement
the public provision are both determined by majority voting. They show that, under standard
assumptions on voter preferences, a regime with positive government provision and no restriction
on private supplement is majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only
government provision. The key intuition is that the median voter, which typically has income
below the mean in the population, will receive positive transfers in equilibrium from richer citizens
if private goods are publicly provided. Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) use a similar model, with the
crucial di⁄erence that the private good is only partially subsidized, to show that it is also possible
to explain public provision of private goods with regressive distributional consequences. While the
political economy considerations in these models are plausible and possibly important for a positive
understanding of why government provides private goods, their results do hinge crucially on the
restrictions imposed on the policy instruments; that is, what is not explained is why transfers must
be in-kind (in the form of publicly provided private goods) instead of pure cash transfers.6
4Related points are made in Boadway et al. (1998) and Blomquist and Christiansen (2007).
5See also Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996) and Gouveia (1997).
6However, see Blomquist and Christiansen (1999) for a model where e¢ ciency gains of in-kind transfers are
combined with a political economy setup.
4The second strand assumes that the government has a preference for redistribution and shows
that public provision of private goods may serve as a tool for redistribution from the rich to the poor.
As in the ￿rst strand of the literature, it also assumes, instead of explains, why in-kind transfers
are preferred to cash transfers. For example, Besley and Coate (1991) considered the case where
the publicly provided private goods are discrete. In their model, if a household is dissatis￿ed with
the (uniform) quality of publicly provided private goods, it opts out and purchases a higher quality
version from the market. If the quality demand increases with income, mainly rich households
opt out from the publicly provided private goods, implying that the system of public provision of
private goods can serve as a transfer towards less wealthy individuals.7 As Besley and Coate (1991)
acknowledged in their concluding remarks, there may exist other feasible policies that can achieve
the same distributional goals more e¢ ciently if one does not restrict attention to in-kind transfers.8
The third strand, to which our paper is most closely related, takes a normative perspective and
identi￿es circumstances under which providing a private good in-kind is a more e¢ cient transfer
instrument than cash transfers. Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) considered an environment where
consumers have private information about their preferences and showed that in-kind transfers can be
desirable due to its screening role, which allows better targeted transfers.9 Coate (1995) considered
an environment where the rich has altruistic preferences towards the poor and would like to insure
the poor￿ s income risks. If cash assistance is given to the poor, the poor may have incentives
not to purchase insurance and exploit the well-know Samaritan￿ s Dilemma. As a result, the rich
may instead prefer to directly provide insurance to the poor. His explanation crucially relies on
the rich￿ s lack of commitment not to help the poor if the poor does not purchase insurance with
the cash assistance.10 Garratt and Marshall (1994) considers the case of the public ￿nancing of
college education. They argue that public ￿nancing of college education (which is a private good)
provides gambles that families desire. Their explanation implicitly relies on the unmodeled notion
that private market can not provide such lotteries demanded by the families.
Our paper complements the above literature by analyzing the full mechanism design problem
faced by a social planner when individuals have private information about their preferences. No-
tably, we do not impose any exogenous restrictions on the set of feasible policy instruments other
7Other arguments based on a desire to redistribute income can be found in Blomquist and Christiansen (1995)
and Cremer and Gahvari (1997).
8See Gahvari and Mattos (2007) for an interesting extension of Besley and Coate (1991).
9See also Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) for similar arguments.
10A similar model is considered by Bruce and Waldman (1991).
5than the natural participation and incentive compatibility constraints in establishing our compari-
son benchmark of what can be achieve by the market in the absence of public provision of private
goods. The key role played by the public provision of private goods in our paper also substantially
di⁄ers from targeted transfer (Blackorby and Donaldson 1988), commitment (Coate 1988) and de-
mand for gambles (Garratt and Marshall 1994). In our paper, the government￿ s involvement in the
provision of private goods provides it with information about individuals￿private good purchases
that facilitates more e¢ cient revenue extraction for the provision of public goods. The feature
of our model that the e¢ ciency rationale for the public provision of private goods does not rely
on redistributive preferences is particularly attractive because several important publicly-provided
private goods have neutral or regressive distributional e⁄ects.
3 The Environment
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of ex ante identical consumers. Consumers
have preferences over a binary and excludable public good, a binary private good and a perfectly
divisible numeraire good that we will refer to as ￿money.￿The public good can be produced at a
cost K > 0; and the binary private good can be produced at unit cost c > 0:
A consumer is characterized by (￿G;￿P) 2 ￿G ￿ ￿P ￿ R2 where ￿G is her valuation for the
public good and ￿P is her valuation for the private good. A consumer￿ s valuations (￿G;￿P) is her
private information. We denote F : ￿G￿￿P ! [0;1] as the cumulative distribution over consumer
types (￿G;￿P); and write FG : ￿G ! [0;1] and FP : ￿P ! [0;1], respectively, as the marginal
cumulative distribution of ￿G and ￿P. Consumers are assumed to be risk neutral. The expected
payo⁄ of a consumer with type (￿G;￿P) who consumes the public good with probability ￿G and
the private good with probability ￿P; and gives up (in expectation) m units of money is given by
u(￿G;￿P;m;￿G;￿P) = ￿G￿G + ￿P￿P ￿ m: (1)
The reader may observe that we have built in the assumption that wealth constraints are always
non-binding in (1). If ￿G and ￿P are upper bounds for ￿G and ￿P respectively, this assumption can
be justi￿ed if every consumer has an endowment of money in excess of ￿G + ￿P: We assume that
c < ￿P:
Remark 1. We have chosen to model the agents in the economy as a continuum in order to obtain
a clean characterization of the optimal mechanism. The characterization of the constrained e¢ cient
6mechanism is much more complicated in a ￿nite population economy with private information. In
particular, the optimal provision rule depends in a non-trivial way on the realized types. However,
in a ￿nite economy with su¢ ciently many agents, the e⁄ects of making the provision rule depend
on announcements become negligible due to intuition similar to that of the ￿Paradox of Voting.￿
As a result, the optimal mechanism can be approximated by a mechanism where no agent is pivotal
to the decision.11 Hence, our convenient continuum assumption can be viewed as an approximation
of a large ￿nite economy.12
Remark 2. However, the continuum speci￿cation has a few awkward technical aspects. In par-
ticular, we will treat the distribution F as a cross-section of agents, which is necessary to interpret
the right hand side of the balanced budget constraint (BB) in Subsection 4.1 as the total revenue
from the mechanism; at the same time, the distribution F is also interpreted as the probability
distribution over types for any individual agents. As is well-known, this is inconsistent with sto-
chastic independence across agents in standard probability measures (see, however, Al-Najjar 2004
for a solution to the problem).
4 Optimal Separate Provision Mechanisms
In this section we analyze the benchmark case where the mechanism designer cannot condition
either the price or the provision probability of one good on a consumer￿ s reported valuation for the
other good. The most obvious way to interpret this setup is that the ￿markets￿for the private and
public goods are physically separated in space and that the designer lacks the technology to track
behavior of individual agents across markets. Formally:
De￿nition 1 A separate provision mechanism is a quadruple (￿G;t;￿P;p); where:
￿ ￿G : ￿G ! [0;1] is the probability of consuming the public good;
￿ t : ￿G ! R is the fee for consuming the public good;
11See Norman (2004). Schmitz (1997) also makes essentially the same point in the context of monopolistic provision
of an excludable public good.
12Note, however, that to get a limit characterization corresponding to the one in this paper, it is necessary to
assume that per capita provision costs stay bounded away from zero as the number of participants goes to in￿nity.
Otherwise, a pivot mechanism will work also with a large ￿nite set of agents (see Hellwig 2003).
7￿ ￿P : ￿P ! [0;1] is the probability of consuming the private good;
￿ p : ￿P ! R is the fee for consuming the private good.
Note that both ￿G and t are functions of the reported valuation for the public good only; and
￿P and p are functions of the reported valuation of the private good only. As will be made clear
below, our notion of separate provision mechanism still leaves room for cross-subsidization between
the private and public goods, which is the only link allowed between the two design problems.
4.1 The Planning Problem
Given a separate provision mechanism, the expected utility for an agent of type (￿G;￿P) is given
by ￿G (￿G)￿G ￿ t(￿G) + ￿P (￿P)￿P ￿ p(￿P): We assume that the planner seeks to maximize the
ex ante expected utility of the representative consumer.
The objective function of the planner can be written as
Z
￿G
Z
￿P
[￿G (￿G)￿G ￿ t(￿G) + ￿P (￿P)￿P ￿ p(￿P)]dF (￿G;￿P) (2)
=
Z
￿G
[￿G (￿G)￿G ￿ t(￿G)]dFG (￿G) +
Z
￿P
[￿P (￿P)￿P ￿ p(￿P)]dFP (￿P):
Since types are assumed to be private information, agents must be willing to disclose their prefer-
ences to the planner. That is, it must be incentive compatible to report truth-fully,
￿G (￿G)￿G ￿ t(￿G) + ￿P (￿P)￿P ￿ p(￿P) ￿ ￿G(c ￿G)￿G ￿ t(c ￿G) + ￿P(c ￿P)￿P ￿ p(c ￿P); (IC)
8(￿G;￿P);(c ￿G; c ￿P) 2 ￿G ￿ ￿P:
We also assume that agents must be willing to participate. Given the continuum-agent formulation,
there is no distinction between interim and ex post participation constraints, and assuming that
the non-participation utility is constant (and normalized to zero), we may write these constraints
as
￿G (￿G)￿G ￿ t(￿G) + ￿P (￿P)￿P ￿ p(￿P) ￿ 0; 8(￿G;￿P) 2 ￿G ￿ ￿P: (IR)
Finally, we assume that the planner must satisfy the natural feasibility constraint, namely that
the total costs for the production of the public and the private goods should not exceed the total
revenue collected from the agents. We may write this constraint as
K
￿
sup
￿G2￿G
￿G (￿G)
￿
+
Z
￿P
c￿P (￿P)dFP (￿P) ￿
Z
￿G
t(￿G)dFG (￿G) +
Z
￿P
p(￿P)dFP (￿P): (BB)
8To understand (BB), note that, since the public good is non-rival, the cost is independent of the
number of agents actually consuming the good. That is, it costs K if the good is provided and
0 otherwise. Our formulation allows the mechanism designer to randomize between provision and
non-provision. While (BB) says that budget balances in expectation, it is easy to adjust transfers
without changing the interim expected payo⁄s in such a way as to balance the budget for sure (see,
e.g., Borgers and Norman 2008).
4.2 Solving the Planning Problem
First, note that an immediate implication of separate provision mechanism assumption is that
a mechanism satis￿es incentive compatibility constraints (IC) if and only if
￿G (￿G)￿G ￿ t(￿G) ￿ ￿G(c ￿G)￿G ￿ t(c ￿G) 8￿G; c ￿G 2 ￿G; (3)
￿P (￿P)￿P ￿ p(￿P) ￿ ￿P(c ￿P)￿P ￿ p(c ￿P) 8￿P; c ￿P 2 ￿P; (4)
where (3) can be viewed as the incentive compatibility constraint for the public good provision and
(4) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the private good provision. Hence, the separability
restrictions make the model completely single-dimensional, and equivalent to a model where one
set of agents care only for the public good and another set of agents care only about the private
good.
Further note that, if (￿￿
G;t￿;￿￿
P;p￿) is an optimal separate provision mechanism, then (￿￿
G;t￿)
solves the following problem given (￿￿
P;p￿) :
max
(￿G;t):￿G![0;1]￿R
￿Z
￿
[￿G (￿G)￿G ￿ t(￿G)]dFG (￿G) +
Z
￿P
[￿
￿
P (￿P)￿P ￿ p
￿ (￿P)]dFP (￿P)
￿
(5)
s.t. 0 ￿ ￿G (￿G)￿G ￿ t(￿G) ￿ ￿G(c ￿G)￿G + t(c ￿G); 8￿G; c ￿G 2 ￿G; (6)
0 ￿ ￿G (￿G)￿G ￿ t(￿G) + ￿
￿
P (￿P)￿P ￿ p
￿ (￿P); 8(￿G;￿P) 2 ￿G ￿ ￿P;
0 ￿
Z
￿G
t(￿G)dFG (￿G) +
Z
￿P
p
￿ (￿P)dFP (￿P) ￿ K
"
sup
￿G2￿G
￿G (￿G)
#
￿
Z
￿P
c￿
￿
P (￿P)dFP (￿P); (7)
and (￿￿
P;p￿) solves the following problem given (￿￿
G;t￿) :
max
(￿P ;p):￿P ![0;1]￿R
￿Z
￿G
[￿
￿
G (￿G)￿G ￿ t
￿ (￿G)]dFG (￿G) +
Z
￿P
[￿P (￿P)￿P ￿ p(￿P)]dFP (￿P)
￿
(8)
s.t. 0 ￿ ￿P (￿P)￿P ￿ p(￿P) ￿ ￿P(c ￿P)￿P + p(c ￿P) 8￿P; c ￿P 2 ￿P (9)
0 ￿ ￿
￿
G (￿G)￿G ￿ t
￿ (￿G) + ￿P (￿P)￿P ￿ p(￿P) 8(￿G;￿P) 2 ￿G ￿ ￿P
0 ￿
Z
￿G
t
￿ (￿G)dFG (￿G) +
Z
￿P
p(￿P)dFP (￿P) ￿ K
"
sup
￿G2￿G
￿
￿
G (￿G)
#
￿
Z
￿P
c￿P (￿P)dFP (￿P):
Both (5) and (8) are problems that can be solved using standard techniques going back to Myerson￿ s
9(1981) analysis of optimal auction design. De￿ne the ￿indirect utility functions￿
UG (￿G) ￿ ￿G￿G (￿G) ￿ t(￿G); (10)
UP (￿P) ￿ ￿P￿P (￿P) ￿ p(￿P):
A routine argument (see, e.g. Mas-Colell et al. 1995, page 888) can be used to establish the
following lemmas:
Lemma 1 Suppose that ￿G =
￿
￿G;￿G
￿
and that the marginal density fG (￿G) is strictly positive
on its support. Then, (￿G;t) satis￿es the incentive compatibility constraints (6) if and only if ￿G
is weakly increasing in ￿G and
UG (￿G) = UG(c ￿G) +
Z ￿G
c ￿G
￿G (x)dx 8￿G; c ￿G 2 ￿G:
Lemma 2 Suppose that ￿P =
￿
￿P;￿P
￿
and that the marginal density fP (￿P) is strictly positive
on its support. Then, (￿P;p) satis￿es the incentive compatibility constraints (9) if and only if ￿P
is weakly increasing in ￿P and
UP (￿P) = U(c ￿P) +
Z ￿P
c ￿P
￿P (x)dx 8￿P; c ￿P 2 ￿P:
Equally routine procedures (see, e.g. Mas-Colell et al. 1995, page 890), using Lemmas 1 and
2, show that the aggregate transfer revenues from the public goods fees and the private goods fees
respectively can be determined purely in terms of the utility of the lowest type and the provision
rules as
Z
￿G
t(￿G)dFG (￿G) =
Z
￿G
￿G (￿G)
￿
￿G ￿
1 ￿ FG (￿G)
fG (￿G)
￿
dFG (￿G) ￿ UG(￿G) (11)
Z
￿P
p(￿P)dFP (￿P) =
Z
￿P
￿P (￿P)
￿
￿P ￿
1 ￿ FP (￿P)
fP (￿P)
￿
dFP (￿P) ￿ UP(￿P): (12)
We also note that, due to the existence of the numeraire good ￿money,￿we can without loss of
generality assume that the participation constraint of type
￿
￿G;￿P
￿
binds:
Lemma 3 Suppose that (￿￿
G;t￿;￿￿
P;p￿) is an optimal separate provision mechanism. Then there
exists
￿
^ t; ^ p
￿
such that
￿
￿￿
G;^ t;￿￿
P; ^ p
￿
is an optimal separate provision mechanism and
￿￿
G
￿
￿G
￿
￿G ￿ ^ t
￿
￿G
￿
+ ￿￿
P
￿
￿P
￿
￿P ￿ ^ p
￿
￿P
￿
= 0
10Since all higher types can mimic
￿
￿G;￿P
￿
; incentive compatibility automatically implies that
the participation constraints hold for all higher types, provided that it is satis￿ed for type
￿
￿G;￿P
￿
:
Using (11) and Lemma 3, we can therefore reformulate (5) as
max
￿G:￿G![0;1]
Z
￿G
[￿G (￿G)￿G]dFG (￿P) ￿ K￿G
￿
￿G
￿
(13)
s.t. 0 ￿
Z
￿G
￿G (￿G)
￿
￿G ￿
1 ￿ FG (￿G)
fG (￿G)
￿
dFG (￿G) ￿ K￿G
￿
￿G
￿
+
Z
￿P
[p￿ (￿P) ￿ c￿
￿
P (￿P)]dFP (￿P) (14)
0 ￿ ￿G (￿G) ￿ 1 for all ￿G (15)
￿G (￿) is weakly increasing. (16)
To understand the objective function, observe that the social feasibility constraint (7) must bind.
The objective function (13) is thus simply obtained by substitution of (7) into the objective func-
tion of the problem, eliminating the constants, and noting, by the fact that ￿G is monotonic, that
sup￿G2￿G ￿G (￿G) = ￿G
￿
￿G
￿
. The integral constraint (14), together with the monotonicity require-
ment (16), combines all incentive and participation constraints; and the constraints in (15) are the
boundary constraints for the provision probabilities.
To facilitate further interpretations, it may be useful to observe that the problem for a pro￿t
maximizing monopolist for the public good would be to maximize
Z
￿G
￿G (￿G)
￿
￿G ￿
1 ￿ FG (￿G)
fG (￿G)
￿
dFG (￿G) ￿ K￿G
￿
￿G
￿
(17)
subject only to the constraints (15) and (16). For this problem, the ￿no-haggling￿logic of Stokey
(1979), Myerson (1981) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) immediately implies that the pro￿t-
maximizing mechanism is, without loss of generality, one where the monopolist charges a single
price.13 However, this result does not extend to our problem where pro￿ts appear as a constraint
in (14). In general, the solution to the problem (13) may very well be a randomized mechanism.14
However, randomizations can be ruled out by making an additional restriction on the distribution
of types. De￿ne
xG (￿G) ￿ ￿G ￿
1 ￿ FG (￿G)
fG (￿G)
; (18)
13If there is a pro￿t-maximizing random mechanism, then a single price mechanism that charges any price in the
support of the randomized mechanism is also optimal.
14This is easy to realize by considering the case with two types, ￿
l
G and ￿
h
G: Assuming that charging a ￿ at fee equal
to ￿
l
G would violate the budget constraint, whereas charging ￿
h
G would give a strict surplus, it is obvious that the
surplus can be made higher by letting the low type agents consume with some probability. The example can easily
be extended to continuous densities.
11which is often referred to as the ￿virtual surplus.￿We can then show the following result:
Lemma 4 Suppose that xG (￿G) as de￿ned in (18) is weakly increasing in ￿G and that ￿￿
G is a
solution to (13). Then there exists some t￿ such that
￿￿
G (￿G) =
8
> <
> :
￿G
￿
￿G
￿
for ￿G ￿ t￿
￿G(￿G)
0 for ￿G < t￿
￿G(￿G)
(19)
Lemma 4 follows almost immediately from the fact that ￿G (￿G) appears linearly in both the
objective function and the constraint. Thus, characterizing the solution to (13) is reduced to
determining two variables: (1) the probability of public good provision ￿G
￿
￿G
￿
; and (2) a user fee
(or equivalently, a threshold valuation for being allowed to consume the good when it is produced).15
In the same spirit, the private goods problem (8) may be reformulated as
max
(￿P):￿P![0;1]
Z
￿P
[￿P (￿P)(￿P ￿ c)]dFP (￿P) (20)
s.t. 0 ￿
Z
￿P
￿P (￿P)
￿
￿P ￿
1 ￿ FP (￿P)
fP (￿P)
￿ c
￿
dFP (￿G)
+
Z
￿G
t￿ (￿G)dFG (￿G) ￿ K￿
￿
G
￿
￿G
￿
(21)
0 ￿ ￿P (￿P) ￿ 1 for all ￿P (22)
￿P (￿) is weakly increasing. (23)
Again the objective function is derived by substituting the (binding) budget constraint into the
objective function of Problem (8) and eliminating constants. A similar argument allows us to
conclude that all we need to do is to ￿nd a price to charge for the private good. Again, the fact
that (20) is not a pro￿t-maximization problem makes it necessary to make regularity assumptions
on the virtual surplus in order to rule out a randomized optimal mechanism. De￿ne
xP (￿P) = ￿P ￿
1 ￿ FP (￿P)
fP (￿P)
: (24)
We have the following result:
15The continuum-consumer assumption in itself trivializes the provision decision in the sense that this can no longer
be made contingent on the realized distribution of types. However, we still need to make a (standard) regularity
assumption in order to obtain the ￿xed price characterization. See Norman (2004) for an assumption that justi￿es
this particular continuum model as a limit of ￿nite economies.
12Lemma 5 Suppose that xP (￿P) as de￿ned in (24) is weakly increasing and that ￿￿
P is a solution
to (20). Then, there exists some p￿ such that
￿￿
P (￿P) =
8
<
:
0 if ￿P < p￿
1 if ￿P ￿ p￿:
(25)
Lemmas 4 and 5 show that, if the marginal distributions are such that the virtual surplus for
each good is monotonic in type, the maximization of (2) subject to (IC), (IR) and (BB) reduces
to a simple optimization problem in three variables, with some slight abuse of notations, (1) a ￿ at
user fee, t￿; for the public good; (2) a probability that the public good will be provided, ￿￿
G (which
may also be reinterpreted as the quantity of the public good); and (3) a ￿xed price, p￿; for the
private good.
Hence, using Lemmas 4 and 5, we obtain the following simpli￿ed planning problem:
max
ft;￿G;pg
￿G
Z ￿G
t
￿G
￿GdFG (￿G) ￿ K￿G +
Z ￿P
p
(￿P ￿ c)dFP (￿P) (26)
s.t 0 ￿ t
￿
1 ￿ FG
￿
t
￿G
￿￿
+ (p ￿ c)[1 ￿ FP (p)] ￿ K￿G; (27)
0 ￿ ￿G ￿ 1: (28)
Proposition 1 Suppose that E￿G > K and that ￿G < K: Then, in any optimal solution (t￿;￿￿
G;p￿)
to (26), the following must be true:
1. p￿ > c;
2. ￿￿
G > 0;
3. t￿ > 0:
Proof. Let ￿;￿ and ￿ respectively be the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint (27) and the
boundary constraints ￿G ￿ 0 and ￿G ￿ 1. The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for an optimum
are:
0 =
Z ￿G
t
￿G
￿GdFG (￿G) + fG
￿
t
￿G
￿￿
t
￿G
￿2
￿ K + ￿fG
￿
t
￿G
￿￿
t
￿G
￿2
￿ ￿K + ￿ ￿ ￿ (29)
￿￿G = 0;￿ (1 ￿ ￿G) = 0;￿ ￿ 0;￿ ￿ 0 (30)
0 = ￿
t
￿G
fG
￿
t
￿G
￿
+ ￿
￿
1 ￿ FG
￿
t
￿G
￿
￿ fG
￿
t
￿G
￿
t
￿G
￿
(31)
0 = ￿(p ￿ c)fP (p) + ￿[(1 ￿ FP (p)) ￿ (p ￿ c)fP (p)] (32)
0 = ￿
￿
t
￿
1 ￿ FG
￿
t
￿G
￿￿
+ (p ￿ c)[1 ￿ FP (p)] ￿ K￿G
￿
;￿ ￿ 0 (33)
13Part 1: If p￿ < c; then the ￿rst term on the right hand side in (32) is strictly positive and the
second is weakly positive, implying that the condition cannot hold. Suppose that p￿ = c: Then,
from (32) either ￿ = 0 or 1￿FP (c) = 0: Since the second condition is ruled out by the assumption
that c < ￿P; the only possibility that remains is that ￿ = 0: But if ￿ = 0 at the optimal solution,
then constraint (27) is not binding, which implies that t￿;￿￿
G must solve the following problem:
max
ft;￿Gg
￿G
Z ￿G
t
￿G
￿GdFG (￿G) ￿ K￿G
s.t. 0 ￿ ￿G ￿ 1:
We note that if ￿￿
G > 0 in the solution, then the objective is monotonically decreasing in t over
￿
￿G;￿G
￿
; thus if ￿￿
G > 0; it must be that t￿ = ￿￿
G￿G: Thus, if ￿￿
G > 0 it must maximize
￿G
"Z ￿G
￿G
￿GdFG (￿G) ￿ K
#
= ￿G [E￿G ￿ K]:
By assumption the bracketed expression [E￿G ￿ K] is strictly positive, so the solution must be
￿￿
G = 1; and thus t￿ = ￿G: But, substituting p￿ = c;t￿ = ￿G and ￿￿
G = 1 into the constraint (27)
we see that
t￿
￿
1 ￿ FG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿￿
+ (p￿ ￿ c)[1 ￿ FP (p￿)] ￿ K￿￿
G = ￿G ￿ K < 0:
Hence, the resource constraint (27) is violated, which contradicts the assertion that ￿ = 0. Thus
we conclude that p￿ > c in any solution to (26).
Part 2: Part 1 establishes that in the optimum p￿ > c, thus if we have ￿￿
G = 0; there must
be a strict budget surplus (the tax collected from the private goods due to p￿ > c is unspent). It
is easy to show that the social surplus can be improved by spending such budget surplus. To see
this, ￿x p￿;t￿ = 0;￿￿
G = 0: But consider ￿￿0
G given by
￿￿0
G =
(p￿ ￿ c)[1 ￿ FP (p￿)]
K
> 0
By construction, constraint (27) is satis￿ed by the alternative simple mechanism
￿
t￿ = 0;￿￿0
G;p￿￿
:
But the surplus under this alternative is
￿￿0
G
Z ￿G
0
￿GdFG (￿G) +
Z ￿P
p￿
(￿P ￿ c)dFP (￿P) >
Z ￿P
p￿
(￿P ￿ c)dFP (￿P):
Hence,
￿
t￿ = 0;￿￿0
G;p￿￿
results in a strict increase in surplus relative to (t￿ = 0;￿￿
G = 0;p￿): A
contradiction.
14Part 3: This is obvious if ￿G > 0; since t￿ = ￿￿
G￿G would be non-distortionary. Suppose t￿ = 0
and ￿G ￿ 0. Since the necessary condition (31) must be satis￿ed, we have ￿[1 ￿ FG (0)] = 0: This
condition can only hold if ￿ = 0: But we have shown in the proof of Part 1 that if ￿ = 0; then
p￿ = c; which contradicts our conclusion in Part 1.
Thus, under some standard regularity conditions, the optimal separate provision mechanism is
characterized by two prices ￿one for the public and one for the private good ￿and a probability
to provide the public good. In particular, it shows that the only government intervention on the
private goods under the optimal separate provision mechanism can be interpreted as a ￿unit tax￿in
the amount of p￿￿c and leave its provision solely to the ￿private sector.￿Hence, under the optimal
separate provision mechanism, the private good can be provided in a completely decentralized
manner via a competitive market (subject to a tax); and the unit tax on the private goods is used
as a cross subsidy from the private good to the production of the public good. The logic is simply
that the welfare cost of a small tax on the private good is second order, since the consumers who
stop consuming the private good have valuations just marginally above the cost of production.
What we ￿nd more interesting is that a public project with positive expected social bene￿ts should
always be undertaken with some positive probability. That is, there is a role for randomizations in
the model. It is also interesting to observe that there should always be a strictly positive user fee
for the public good. The logic for this result is similar to the argument for why there should be
a positive tax on the private good, but runs counter the idea that excluding consumers when the
marginal cost is zero is always bad.
The characterization of (t￿;￿￿
G;p￿) in Proposition 1 will be used as the comparison benchmark
in the section in which we examine whether joint provision mechanisms can improve social welfare.
In obtaining the above characterization, it is worth emphasizing again that we imposed only the
restriction neither the access probabilities nor the fees for both the private and the public goods
depends on the consumer￿ s reported valuation of the other good, but did not impose any other
restrictions were made on the set of admissible mechanisms. This is in contrast to the existing
literature we reviewed in Section 2 where the desirability of public provision of private goods is
typically established with some restriction on the available policy instruments or some kind of
market imperfection when the government is not involved in the provision of the private goods.
155 Public Provision of Both Goods
We have argued that the optimal separate provision mechanism characterized in Section 4 is
consistent with an economy where the private good is traded on a competitive market (subject
to a tax), and where the public good is provided by a government entity with resources coming
from public good user fees and private good tax revenue. We will now consider a setup where
the government is able to condition the provision probability and price for each of the two goods
on the reported valuations of both goods. We interpret this as public provision of both goods since
this is inconsistent with a world where the trading of the private good is done anonymously in the
￿private sector.￿
In general, a direct revelation mechanism can be represented as a quadruple
￿
f ￿G;e t; f ￿P; e p
￿
,
where the di⁄erence with Section 4 is that all these functions are over the domain ￿G ￿ ￿P;
whereas the corresponding objects in the separable case are functions of either ￿G or ￿P. This
leads to a multidimensional mechanism design problem, and there is no known methodology to
characterize incentive compatibility in an analytically tractable way.
To get a tractable problem, we will proceed along the lines of McAfee et al. [25] and consider
a class of simple mechanisms. Speci￿cally, we will add a single instrument to the separate pro-
vision case, so that instead of considering mechanisms of the form (t;￿G;p) as characterized in
Proposition 1, we will consider mechanisms of the form (t;￿G;p;￿); where (t;￿G;p) have the same
interpretations as before, respectively as the user fee for the public good, the provision probability
for the public good, and the price of the private good; but ￿ now is the fee charged for an agent
who consumes both the public and the private good. If ￿ 6= t + p; this requires that the govern-
ment be actively involved in provision of the private good because such a scheme is feasible for the
government only if it could monitor the consumers￿purchases of the private goods.
While it is obviously a limitation that we are not able to characterize the constrained e¢ cient
mechanism for the full-blown mechanism design problem, the reader may note that, if we ￿nd
that ￿ 6= t + p in the solution to our simpli￿ed problem, then it must be that the constrained
e¢ cient mechanism is also one in which the government takes an active part in the provision of
the private good. Therefore, this su¢ ces to answer the qualitative question we are interested in,
namely whether public provision of a private good can be e¢ ciency enhancing.
165.1 Some Preliminaries
Consider a (simple pricing) mechanism on the form (t;￿G;p;￿). It is easy to see that a consumer
will demand:
Only the Public Good if:
￿G￿G ￿ t ￿ 0 (34)
￿G￿G ￿ t ￿ ￿P ￿ p
￿G￿G ￿ t ￿ ￿G￿G + ￿P ￿ ￿
Only the Private Good if:
￿P ￿ p ￿ 0 (35)
￿P ￿ p ￿ ￿G￿G ￿ t
￿P ￿ p ￿ ￿G￿G + ￿P ￿ ￿
The Bundle if:
￿G￿G + ￿P ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 (36)
￿G￿G + ￿P ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿G￿G ￿ t
￿G￿G + ￿P ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿P ￿ p
Which of the inequalities in (34), (35) and (36) are relevant depends on whether the bundle is
cheaper or more expensive than the components. Figures 1 and 2 respectively represent the con-
sumer￿ s demand for the private and public goods as a function of her valuation types (￿G;￿P)
where for simplicity we multiplied her public valuation type by the provision probability ￿G. The
following two claims are obvious from the inspection of Figures 1 and 2.
Claim 1 If ￿ ￿ t+p; the second inequality in (34) and (35) is implied by the other two inequalities.
And,
￿ the proportion of agents purchasing the public good only is
Z ￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿￿t
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
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Figure 1: Consumers￿Demand for the Case ￿ ￿ t + p.
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18￿ the proportion of agents purchasing the private good only is
Z ￿P
p
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿G
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P
￿ the proportion of agents purchasing the bundle is
Z t
￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿￿G￿G
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G +
Z ￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿t
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
Claim 2 If ￿ ￿ t + p; the ￿rst inequality in (36) is implied by the other two inequalities. And,
￿ the proportion of agents purchasing the public good only is
Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿G￿G+p￿t
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G +
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿￿t
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
￿ the proportion of agents purchasing the private good only is
Z ￿￿t
p
Z ￿P +t￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P +
Z ￿P
￿￿t
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P
￿ the proportion of agents purchasing the bundle is
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿t
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
De￿ne by G1 (t;p;￿;￿G) the budget surplus (when positive) given a mechanism (t;￿G;p;￿)
under case one when ￿ ￿ t + p: Using Claim 1, it can be written as:
G1 (t;p;￿;￿G) = t
"Z ￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿￿t
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
#
+ (p ￿ c)
"Z ￿P
p
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P
#
(37)
+(￿ ￿ c)
"Z t
￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿￿G￿G
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G +
Z ￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿t
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
#
￿ K￿G;
Symmetrically, we let G2 (t;p;￿;￿G) denote the budget surplus given a mechanism (t;￿G;p;￿)
where ￿ ￿ t + p; which using Claim 2 can be written as:
G2 (t;p;￿;￿G) = t
"Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿G￿G+p￿t
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G +
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z p
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
#
(38)
+(p ￿ c)
"Z ￿￿t
p
Z ￿P +t￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P +
Z ￿P
￿￿t
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P
#
+(￿ ￿ c)
"Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿t
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
#
￿ K￿G:
19Next, let S1 (t;p;￿;￿G) denote the social surplus associated with (t;￿G;p;￿) in the case when
￿ ￿ t + p,
S1 (t;p;￿;￿G) =
Z ￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿￿t
￿P
￿G￿Gf (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G +
Z ￿P
p
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿G
(￿P ￿ c)f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P (39)
+
Z t
￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿￿G￿G
(￿G￿G + ￿P ￿ c)f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
+
Z ￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿t
(￿G￿G + ￿P ￿ c)f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G ￿ K￿G:
and let S2 (t;p;￿;￿G) be the social surplus associated with (t;￿G;p;￿) in the case when ￿ ￿ t + p,
S2 (t;p;￿;￿G) =
Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿G￿G+p￿t
￿P
￿G￿Gf (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G +
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿￿t
￿P
￿G￿Gf (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G (40)
+
Z ￿￿t
p
Z ￿P +t￿p
￿G
￿
(￿P ￿ c)f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P +
Z ￿P
￿￿t
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
(￿P ￿ c)f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P
+
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿t
(￿G￿G + ￿P ￿ c)f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G ￿ K￿G:
For notational brevity we will let z = (t;p;￿) and z￿ = (t￿;p￿;t￿ + p￿); where (t￿;￿￿
G;p￿) is an
optimal solution to the separate provision problem (26) in Section 4. Now we de￿ne two auxiliary
problems. First consider the problem of:
max
(t;p;￿)
S1 (t;p;￿;￿￿
G) (41)
s.t. G1 (t;p;￿;￿￿
G) ￿ 0
t + p ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:
Problem (41) gives the best simple pricing policy in the form of (t;￿G;p;￿) under the restriction that
￿G = ￿￿
G and ￿ ￿ t + p; that is, the public good provision probability is ￿xed at the level as in the
optimal separate provision mechanism characterized in Proposition 1, and the bundle is restricted
to be no more expensive than separate purchase of its components. Problem (41) will tell us
the maximal attainable social surplus when one deviates from the the optimal separable provision
mechanism among a particular set of perturbations (namely, charging the bundle of public and
private goods a lower price than the sum of its components), while respecting the budget balance
constraint. Notice that the separate provision mechanism prices z￿ = (t￿;p￿;t￿ + p￿) is in the
constraint set of Problem (41).
20Symmetrically, consider the problem of:
max
(t;p;￿)
S2 (t;p;￿;￿￿
G) (42)
s.t. G2 (t;p;￿;￿￿
G) ￿ 0
￿ ￿ t ￿ p ￿ 0:
Problem (42) gives the best simple pricing policy in the form of (t;￿G;p;￿) under the restriction
that ￿G = ￿￿
G and ￿ ￿ t + p. That is, the public good provision probability is ￿xed at the level
as in the optimal separate provision mechanism characterized in Proposition 1, and the bundle is
restricted to be no cheaper than separate purchase of its components. Problem (42) will tell us
the maximal attainable social surplus when one deviates from the the optimal separable provision
mechanism among another particular set of perturbations (namely, charging the bundle of public
and private goods a higher price than the sum of its components), while respecting the budget
balance constraint. Notice again that the separate provision mechanism prices z￿ = (t￿;p￿;t￿ + p￿)
is in the constraint set of Problem (42).
If there is no potential improvement of joint provision mechanism over the optimal separate pro-
vision mechanism we characterized in Proposition 1, a necessary condition is that (t￿;p￿;￿ = t￿ + p￿)
must solve both Problems (41) and (42).
5.2 The Main Result
Now we show our main result, which is a su¢ cient condition under which (t￿;p￿;￿ = t￿ + p￿)
cannot simultaneously solve both Problems (41) and (42). As a result, when the identi￿ed condition
is satis￿ed, there must exist a simple pricing joint provision mechanism that improves social welfare
upon the optimal separate provision mechanisms.
To this end, we ￿rst introduce a few notations. Di⁄erentiating (37) and evaluating at z = z￿ =
21(t￿;p￿;t￿ + p￿); we ￿nd that:16
@G1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
fFP (p￿j￿G) + (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)gfG (￿G)d￿G
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
(43a)
@G1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
=
Z t￿
￿￿
G
￿G
[f(1 ￿ FP (p￿j￿G)) ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)g]fG (￿G)d￿G
+
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
1 ￿ FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
(43b)
@G1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
f(1 ￿ FP (p￿j￿G)) ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)gfG (￿G)d￿G
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
1 ￿ FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
(43c)
These expressions inform us about the e⁄ect on the budget when one slightly perturbs the relevant
prices t;p and ￿:
Likewise, if we di⁄erentiate S1 (￿) in (39) and evaluate at z = z￿; we obtain:
@S1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)fG (￿G)d￿G ￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
(44a)
@S1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
= ￿
Z t￿
￿￿
G
￿G
(p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)fG (￿G)d￿G +
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
1 ￿ FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
(44b)
@S1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
= ￿
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)fG (￿G)d￿G ￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
1 ￿ FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
: (44c)
We can also write out explicitly the gradients for S2 and G2, which we omit here.
Remark. The reader may notice that expression @G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)=@p in (43b) corresponds directly
to the expression in Proposition 1 of McAfee et al. (1989). Expression (43a) can also be written in
that form by reversing the roles of ￿G and ￿P: This close correspondence with McAfee et al. (1989)
is not a coincidence. The derivatives reported above can be thought of as the e⁄ect on pro￿ts
given a marginal increase in t; p and ￿ respectively, which is exactly what McAfee et al. (1989)
was analyzing. In their case, going from (43b) to their main result is relatively straightforward
since they asked for a direction where the mixed bundling mechanism increases pro￿ts relative
to separate pricing. In particular, (t￿;p￿) in their case were chosen to solve a monopolist pro￿t
maximization problem under separate pricing, thus p￿; for example, must satisfy the ￿rst order
optimality condition [1 ￿ FP (p￿)] ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿) = 0: Hence, the ￿rst term in (43b), if ￿G and
16The details of the derivations for (43) and (44) are available in an Appendix from the authors￿websites.
22￿P are stochastically independent, becomes:
Z t￿
￿￿
G
￿G
f[1 ￿ FP (p￿j￿G)] ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)gfG (￿G)d￿G (45)
=
Z t￿
￿￿
G
￿G
f[1 ￿ FP (p￿)] ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿)gfG (￿G);
which is equal to zero from the optimality condition of p￿ in their problem. Thus it follows imme-
diately from (43b) that a small increase in the price of the private good (or a small decrease in the
price from the bundle) would increase the pro￿ts in the case of stochastic independence. It can also
be veri￿ed that, by rewriting @G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)=@t (to be explicit about the optimality condition for t￿
for the monopolist pro￿t-maximization problem), that a small increase in the price of the public
good also increases pro￿ts if ￿G and ￿P are stochastically independent.
Our problem di⁄ers from McAfee et al. (1989) in two respects. First of all, our goal is to
demonstrate that bundling can increase social welfare rather than pro￿ts. Secondly, because (t￿;p￿)
in our problem, as characterized in Proposition 1, are not chosen to maximize pro￿ts, we cannot
use the ￿rst order conditions from the optimal separable provision mechanism in the same way as
McAfee et al. (1989).
Our ￿rst preliminary result is that in fact, evaluated at an optimal separate provision mechanism
prices (t￿;p￿;￿ = t￿ + p￿), the partial derivatives of G1 and G2 are the same, and the partial
derivatives of S1 and S2 also coincide. Letting DGi (z;;￿G) and DSi (z;￿G) denote the gradient
vectors for i = 1;2; we thus have that;
Lemma 6 DG1 (z￿;￿￿
G) = DG2 (z￿;￿￿
G) and DS1 (z￿;￿￿
G) = DS2 (z￿;￿￿
G)
Now we establish a useful lemma:
Lemma 7 Let ￿￿ be the multiplier on constraint (27) corresponding to the solution (￿￿
G;t￿;p￿) of
problem (26). Also, let ￿i be the multiplier on the resource constraint Gi (t;p;￿;￿￿
G) for i = 1;2 in
problem (41) and (42). Then,
1. ￿1 = ￿￿ if z￿ solves problem (41);
2. ￿2 = ￿￿ if z￿ solves problem (42).
23Proof. First consider (41). If z￿ solves the problem, the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for a
solution must be ful￿lled at z￿: Hence, there must exist ￿1 > 0 and ￿1 ￿ 0 such that
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@t
+ ￿1
@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@t
+ ￿1 = 0 (46a)
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@p
+ ￿1
@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@p
+ ￿1 = 0 (46b)
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@￿
+ ￿1
@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@￿
￿ ￿1 = 0 (46c)
￿1 (t + p ￿ ￿) = 0; ￿1 ￿ 0 (46d)
Using the expressions for the partial derivatives in (43) and (44), it is easy to check that:
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@t
+
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@￿
= ￿
t￿
￿￿
G
fG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
(47a)
@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@t
+
@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@￿
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
fG (￿G)d￿G ￿
t￿
￿￿
G
fG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
=
￿
1 ￿ FG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿￿
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
fG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
: (47b)
Combining (46a) and (46c), and using (47), we have that
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
fG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
+ ￿1
￿￿
1 ￿ FG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿￿
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
fG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿￿
= 0: (48)
This condition is the same as (31), the ￿rst order condition to the problem when the goods are sold
separately. It follows that ￿1 = ￿￿; since otherwise (48) will be violated. This proves the ￿rst part.
For the second part, we note that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for Problem (42) are
@S2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
+ ￿2
@G2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
￿ ￿2 =
@S1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
+ ￿2
@G1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
￿ ￿2 = 0
@S2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
+ ￿2
@G2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
￿ ￿2 =
@S1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
+ ￿2
@G1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
￿ ￿2 = 0
@S2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
+ ￿2
@G2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
+ ￿2 =
@S1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
+ ￿2
@G1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
+ ￿2 = 0
￿2 (t + p ￿ ￿) = 0;￿2 ￿ 0
where the ￿rst equality in each line follows from Lemma 6. The same argument applies.
Together, Lemmas 6 and 7 makes the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for problem (41) comparable
with those of problem (42). Now our main result about the su¢ cient condition for the welfare
improvement potential of public provision of private goods over the optimal separate provision
mechanism follows:
24Proposition 2 Let ￿￿ be the multiplier on constraint (27) corresponding to the solution (￿￿
G;t￿;p￿)
of problem (26). Then, there exists a feasible simple pricing policy (t;p;￿) that generates a higher
social surplus than the optimal separate provision mechanism whenever
DS1 (z￿;￿￿
G) + ￿￿DG1 (z￿;￿￿
G) 6= 0: (49)
Proof. From Lemma 7, we know that if z￿ solves both problems (41) and (42), the multiplier in
each problem must be given by ￿￿: Thus if z￿ is the best simple pricing policy for problem (41),
then
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@t
+ ￿￿@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@t
+ ￿1 = 0 (50)
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@p
+ ￿￿@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@p
+ ￿1 = 0
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@￿
+ ￿￿@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@￿
￿ ￿1 = 0
￿1 (t + p ￿ ￿) = 0; ￿1 ￿ 0:
Similarly if z￿ is the best simple pricing policy for problem (42), then by using Lemma 6, we have
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@t
+ ￿￿@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@t
￿ ￿2 = 0 (51)
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@p
+ ￿￿@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@p
￿ ￿2 = 0
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@￿
+ ￿￿@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@￿
+ ￿2 = 0
￿2 (t + p ￿ ￿) = 0; ￿2 ￿ 0
Assume that ￿1 > 0: Then, (50) implies that
@S1(z￿;￿￿
G)
@t + ￿￿ @G1(z￿;￿￿
G)
@t < 0; which makes it
impossible to ￿nd ￿2 ￿ 0 such that (51) holds. Symmetrically, if ￿2 > 0; then
@S1(z￿;￿￿
G)
@t +
￿￿ @G1(z￿;￿￿
G)
@t > 0; which makes it impossible to ￿nd ￿1 ￿ 0 such that (50) holds. Since z￿ must
solve both (41) and (42) for there to be no improvement we conclude that ￿1 = ￿2 = 0; or else
there is some z better than z￿: The claim follows.
Because the simple pricing joint provision mechanism is a subset of all feasible joint provision
mechanisms, an immediate implication of Proposition 2 is that whenever condition (49) is satis￿ed,
the optimal joint provision mechanism must generate higher social welfare than the optimal separate
provision mechanism.
255.3 Stochastic Independence
Now we use Proposition 2 above to examine the case where ￿G and ￿P are stochastically inde-
pendent. In this case we have that there is indeed always an improvement over the optimal separate
provision policy.
Proposition 3 Suppose that ￿G and ￿P are stochastically independent. Then
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@p
+ ￿￿@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@p
> 0:
Proof. When fP (￿Pj￿G) = fP (￿P) for all ￿P we have that
@G1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@p
= [1 ￿ FP (p￿) ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿)]FG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
+
t￿
￿￿
G
[1 ￿ FP (p￿)]fG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
=
(p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿)
￿￿ FG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
+
t￿
￿￿
G
[1 ￿ FP (p￿)]fG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
where the second equality uses (32), the ￿rst order condition for p￿ in the separable case. Next,
@S1 (z￿;￿￿
G)
@p
= ￿(p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿)FG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
+
t￿
￿￿
G
[1 ￿ FP (p￿)]fG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
Hence,
@S1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
+ ￿
￿@G1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
= ￿(p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿)FG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
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t￿
￿
￿
G
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t￿
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￿
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￿
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￿
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G
[1 ￿ FP (p￿)]fG
￿
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￿
￿
G
￿￿
= (1 + ￿
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t￿
￿
￿
G
[1 ￿ FP (p￿)]fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
> 0:
Proposition 3 establishes that when the valuations for the private and public goods are sto-
chastically independent, there is a welfare improving role for the public provision of private goods
over the optimal separate provision mechanism we characterized in Proposition 1. It also implies,
by continuity, that there exists an open set of joint distribution functions for ￿G and ￿P for which
public provision of private goods can be preferred from an e¢ ciency viewpoint.17
17We conjecture is that condition (49) is satis￿ed generically in the sense that it holds for almost all joint distribution
functions.
266 Conclusion
This paper shows that public provision of private goods may be justi￿ed on pure e¢ ciency
grounds in an environment where individuals consume both public and private goods. The govern-
ment￿ s involvement in the provision of private goods provides it with information about individuals￿
private good purchases that facilitates more e¢ cient revenue extraction for the provision of public
goods. We show that public provision of the private good improves economic e¢ ciency under a
condition that is always ful￿lled under stochastic independence and satis￿ed for an open set of joint
distributions.
The e¢ ciency rationale for the public provision of private goods we advanced in this paper dif-
fers substantially from explanations emphasized in the existing literature, which typically rely on
preferences for redistribution. Our result is also derived under considerably less stringent restric-
tions on the set of admissible policies than the existing literature. We do not impose any restrictions
on the benchmark outcome that can be implemented under the optimal separate provision mech-
anism, which is in stark contrast to the existing literature where the benchmark outcome is often
derived under various implicit restrictions on the market operations. The no-arbitrage restriction
we require for the joint provision mechanism to improve upon the benchmark outcome in our model
also accords with many publicly-provided private goods we see in reality because in-state college
tuition, public health insurance, and public schools are all commodities that are di¢ cult to resell.
Thus our paper also provides an explanation of why some, but not all, private goods are publicly
provided.
Finally, our analysis also exempli￿es a more general point about the optimal taxation literature.
Our design problem combines a simple commodity taxation problem with an excludable public good
provision problem. We found that the marginal price for access to the public good for consumers
that purchase the private good should be di⁄erent from those who do not. Hence, our model is a
stylized example where provision and user fees for the public good, and taxes on the private good
must be jointly determined in order to achieve economic e¢ ciency. Our paper thus illustrates that
the standard practice of separating the question of how a given budget should be spent from the
question of how a given tax revenue should be raised generates e¢ ciency losses.
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A Appendix: Omitted Details of Some Derivations
A.1 Derivation of Derivatives in (43):
For simplicity of notation, de￿ne:
A1 (z;￿G) ￿ t
"Z ￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿￿t
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
#
;
B1 (z;￿G) ￿ (p ￿ c)
"Z ￿P
p
Z ￿￿p
￿￿
G
￿G
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P
#
;
C1 (z;￿G) ￿ (￿ ￿ c)
"Z t
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￿￿p
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Z ￿P
￿￿￿G￿G
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t
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f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
#
;
so that
G1 (z;￿G) = A1 (z;￿G) + B1 (z;￿G) + C1 (z;￿G) ￿ K￿G:
Di⁄erentiating with respect to t; we have:
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:
Thus,
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1So,
@G1 (z￿)
@t
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(Z p
￿
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿P + (p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)
)
d￿G ￿ t￿
Z p
￿
￿P
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P (A1)
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
Z p
￿
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)
R ￿P
￿P f (￿G;￿P)d￿P
| {z }
fP(￿Pj￿G)
d￿P + (p￿ ￿ c)
f (￿G;p￿)
R ￿P
￿P f (￿G;￿P)d￿P
| {z }
fP(p￿j￿G)
9
> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
 Z ￿P
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿P
!
| {z }
fG(￿G)
d￿Gd￿G
￿t￿
Z p
￿
￿P
f
￿
t
￿
￿￿
G;￿P
￿
R ￿P
￿P f
￿
t￿
￿￿
G;￿P
￿
d￿P
| {z }
fP
￿
￿Pj t￿
￿￿
G
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P
Z ￿P
￿P
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
d￿P
| {z }
fG
￿
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(Z p
￿
￿P
fP (￿Pj￿G)d￿P + (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)
)
fG (￿G)d￿G ￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
Z p
￿
￿P
fP
￿
￿Pj
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
d￿PfG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
fFP (p￿j￿G) + (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)gfG (￿G)d￿G ￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
:
Di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿ yields:
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Di⁄erentiating with respect to p yields:
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A.2 Derivation of Derivatives in (44):
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￿
G)
@t
= ￿
Z p
￿
￿P
t￿f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P ￿
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
￿
G￿Gf (￿G;p￿)d￿G +
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(￿
￿
G￿G + p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
= ￿
Z p
￿
￿P
t￿
￿
￿
G
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
d￿P +
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)fG (￿G)d￿G ￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
5and,
@S1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
=
@D1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
+
@E1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
+
@F1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
= ￿
Z t￿
￿G
￿
(p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)d￿G ￿
Z ￿P
p￿
(￿P ￿ c)f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P
+
Z ￿P
p￿
(t￿ + ￿P ￿ c)f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P
= ￿
Z t￿
￿G
￿
(p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)d￿G +
Z ￿P
p￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
d￿P
= ￿
Z t￿
￿G
￿
(p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)fG (￿G)d￿G +
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
1 ￿ FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
;
and,
@S1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
=
@D1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
+
@E1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
+
@F1 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
￿
G￿Gf (￿G;p￿)d￿Pd￿G +
Z ￿P
p￿
(￿P ￿ c)f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P
￿
Z ￿P
p￿
(t￿ + ￿P ￿ c)f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P ￿
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(￿
￿
G￿G + p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
= ￿
Z ￿P
p￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
d￿P ￿
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
= ￿
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)fG (￿G)d￿G ￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
1 ￿ FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
:
A.3 Calculations in Proving Lemma 6
￿ Part 1: DG1 (z￿;￿￿
G) = DG2 (z￿;￿￿
G):
Write G2 (z;￿G) = A2 (z;￿G) + B2 (z;￿G) + C2 (z;￿G) ￿ K￿G where:
A2 (z;￿G) ￿ t
"Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿G￿G+p￿t
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G +
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿￿t
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
#
B2 (z;￿G) ￿ (p ￿ c)
"Z ￿￿t
p
Z ￿P +t￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P +
Z ￿P
￿￿t
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P
#
C2 (z;￿G) ￿ (￿ ￿ c)
"Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿t
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
#
:
6Di⁄erentiating A2 we get:
@A2 (z;￿G)
@t
=
"Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿G￿G+p￿t
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G +
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿￿t
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
#
￿t
"Z p
￿P
f
￿
t
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P +
Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
f (￿G;￿G￿G + p ￿ t)d￿G +
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G
#
@A2 (z;￿G)
@p
= ￿t
Z ￿￿t
￿P
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P + t
Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
f (￿G;￿G￿G + p ￿ t)d￿G + t
Z ￿￿t
￿P
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P
= t
Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
f (￿G;￿G￿G + p ￿ t)d￿G
@A2 (z;￿G)
@￿
= t
Z ￿￿t
￿P
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P ￿ t
Z ￿￿t
￿P
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P + t
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G
= t
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d
Hence,
@A2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
Z p
￿
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G ￿ t￿
2
4
Z p
￿
￿P
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P +
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
3
5
@A2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
= 0
@A2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
= t￿
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
f (￿G;p￿)d￿G:
Similarly,
@B2 (z;￿G)
@t
= (p ￿ c)
"
￿
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G +
Z ￿￿t
p
f
￿
￿P + t ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P +
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G
#
= (p ￿ c)
￿Z ￿￿t
p
f
￿
￿P + t ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P
￿
@B2 (z;￿G)
@p
=
Z ￿￿t
p
Z ￿P +t￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P +
Z ￿P
￿￿t
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
￿(p ￿ c)
"Z t
￿G
￿
f (￿G;p)d￿G +
Z ￿￿t
p
f
￿
￿P + t ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P +
Z ￿P
￿￿t
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
d￿P
#
@B2 (z;￿G)
@￿
= (p ￿ c)
"Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿Gd￿P ￿
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G +
Z ￿P
￿￿t
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿G
#
= (p ￿ c)
"Z ￿P
￿￿t
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿G
#
:
7Hence,
@B2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
= 0
@B2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
=
Z ￿P
p￿
Z t￿
￿￿
G
￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)
"Z t￿
￿￿
G
￿
f (￿G;p￿)d￿G +
Z ￿P
p￿
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
d￿P
#
@B2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
= (p￿ ￿ c)
"Z ￿P
p￿
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿G
#
:
Similarly,
@C2 (z;￿G)
@t
= (￿ ￿ c)
"Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G
#
@C2 (z;￿G)
@p
= (￿ ￿ c)
"Z ￿P
￿￿t
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P
#
@C2 (z;￿G)
@￿
=
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿t
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G ￿ (￿ ￿ c)
"Z ￿P
￿￿t
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P +
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G
#
:
Hence,
@C2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
= (t￿ + p￿ ￿ c)
2
4
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
3
5
@C2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
= (t￿ + p￿ ￿ c)
"Z ￿P
p￿
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P
#
@C2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
Z ￿P
p￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G ￿ (t￿ + p￿ ￿ c)
2
4
Z ￿P
p￿
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P +
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
3
5
Combining terms we get that
@G2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
=
@A2 (z￿)
@t
+
@B2 (z￿)
@t
+
@C2 (z￿)
@t
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
Z p
￿
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G ￿ t￿
2
4
Z p
￿
￿P
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P +
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
3
5
+(t￿ + p￿ ￿ c)
2
4
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
3
5
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(Z p
￿
￿P
f (￿G;￿P)d￿P + (p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)
)
d￿G ￿ t￿
Z p
￿
￿P
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(Z p
￿
￿P
fP (￿Pj￿G)d￿P + (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)
)
fG (￿G)d￿G ￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
Z p
￿
￿P
fP
￿
￿Pj
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
d￿PfG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
fFP (p￿j￿G) + (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)gfG (￿G)d￿G ￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
=
@G1 (z￿)
@t
;
8and,
@G2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
=
@A2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
+
@B2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
+
@C2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
=
Z ￿P
p￿
Z t￿
￿￿
G
￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)
"Z t￿
￿￿
G
￿
f (￿G;p￿)d￿G +
Z ￿P
p￿
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
d￿P
#
+(t￿ + p￿ ￿ c)
"Z ￿P
p￿
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P
#
=
Z t￿
￿￿
G
￿
(Z ￿P
p￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿P ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)
)
d￿G + t￿
"Z ￿P
p￿
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P
#
=
Z t￿
￿￿
G
￿
f1 ￿ FP (p￿j￿G) ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)gfG (￿G)d￿G + t￿
￿
1 ￿ FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
=
@G1 (z￿)
@p
@G2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
=
@A2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
+
@B2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
+
@C2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
= t￿
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
f (￿G;p￿)d￿G + (p￿ ￿ c)
"Z ￿P
p￿
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿G
#
+
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
Z ￿P
p￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G ￿ (t￿ + p￿ ￿ c)
2
4
Z ￿P
p￿
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P +
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
3
5
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(Z ￿P
p￿
f (￿G;￿P)d￿P ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)
)
d￿G ￿ t￿
"Z ￿P
p￿
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P
#
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
f1 ￿ FP (p￿j￿G) ￿ (p￿ ￿ c)fP (p￿j￿G)gfG (￿G)d￿G ￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
1 ￿ FP
￿
p￿j
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿
fG
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
￿￿
=
@G1 (z￿)
@￿
￿ Part 2: DS1 (z￿;￿￿
G) = DS2 (z￿;￿￿
G):
Write S2 (z;￿G) = D2 (z;￿G) + E2 (z;￿G) + F2 (z;￿G) ￿ K￿G where
D2 (z;￿G) =
Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
Z ￿G￿G+p￿t
￿P
￿G￿Gf (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G +
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿￿t
￿P
￿G￿Gf (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G
E2 (z;￿G) =
Z ￿￿t
p
Z ￿P +t￿p
￿G
￿
(￿P ￿ c)f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P +
Z ￿P
￿￿t
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
(￿P ￿ c)f (￿G;￿P)d￿Gd￿P
F2 (z;￿G) =
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
Z ￿P
￿￿t
(￿G￿G + ￿P ￿ c)f (￿G;￿P)d￿Pd￿G:
9Thus,
@D2 (z;￿G)
@t
= ￿
Z p
￿P
t
￿G
f
￿
t
￿G
;￿P
￿
d￿P ￿
Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
￿G￿Gf (￿G;￿G￿G + p ￿ t)d￿G ￿
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
￿G￿Gf (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G
@D2 (z;￿G)
@p
= ￿
Z ￿￿t
￿P
￿ ￿ p
￿G
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
d￿P +
Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
￿G￿Gf (￿G;￿G￿G + p ￿ t)d￿Pd￿G +
Z ￿￿t
￿P
￿ ￿ p
￿G
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
d￿P
=
Z ￿￿p
￿G
t
￿G
￿G￿Gf (￿G;￿G￿G + p ￿ t)d￿Pd￿G
@D2 (z;￿G)
@￿
=
Z ￿￿t
￿P
￿ ￿ p
￿G
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
d￿P ￿
Z ￿￿t
￿P
￿ ￿ p
￿G
f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
d￿P +
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
￿G￿Gf (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G
=
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
￿G￿Gf (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G;
so,
@D2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
= ￿
Z p
￿
￿P
t￿
￿
￿
G
f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
d￿P ￿
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
￿
G￿Gf (￿G;p￿)d￿G
@D2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
= 0
@D2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
￿
￿
G￿Gf (￿G;p￿)d￿G;
which is the same as in (A2).
Similarly,
@E2 (z;￿G)
@t
= ￿
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
(￿ ￿ t ￿ c)f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G +
Z ￿￿t
p
(￿P ￿ c)f
￿
￿P + t ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P
+
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
(￿ ￿ t ￿ c)f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G
=
Z ￿￿t
p
(￿P ￿ c)f
￿
￿P + t ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P
@E2 (z;￿G)
@p
= ￿
Z t
￿G
￿
(p ￿ c)f (￿G;p)d￿G ￿
Z ￿￿t
p
(￿P ￿ c)f
￿
￿P + t ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P
￿
Z ￿P
￿￿t
(￿P ￿ c)f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P
@E2 (z;￿G)
@￿
=
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
(￿ ￿ t ￿ c)f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G ￿
Z ￿￿p
￿G
￿
(￿ ￿ t ￿ c)f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G
+
Z ￿P
￿￿t
(￿P ￿ c)f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P
=
Z ￿P
￿￿t
(￿P ￿ c)f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P;
10so,
@E2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
= 0
@E2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
= ￿
Z t￿
￿￿
G
￿
(p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)d￿G ￿
Z ￿P
p￿
(￿P ￿ c)f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P
@E2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
=
Z ￿P
p￿
(￿P ￿ c)f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P;
which is the same as the expressions in (A3).
Finally,
@F2 (z;￿G)
@t
=
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
(￿G￿G + ￿ ￿ t ￿ c)f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G
@F2 (z;￿G)
@p
=
Z ￿P
￿￿t
(￿ ￿ p + ￿P ￿ c)f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P
@F2 (z;￿G)
@￿
= ￿
Z ￿P
￿￿t
(￿ ￿ p + ￿P ￿ c)f
￿
￿ ￿ p
￿G
;￿P
￿
1
￿G
d￿P ￿
Z ￿G
￿￿p
￿G
(￿G￿G + ￿ ￿ t ￿ c)f (￿G;￿ ￿ t)d￿G;
so,
@F2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@t
=
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
(￿
￿
G￿G + p￿ ￿ c)f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
@F2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@p
=
Z ￿P
p￿
(t￿ + ￿P ￿ c)f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P
@F2 (z￿;￿
￿
G)
@￿
= ￿
Z ￿P
p￿
(t￿ + ￿P ￿ c)f
￿
t￿
￿
￿
G
;￿P
￿
1
￿
￿
G
d￿P ￿
Z ￿G
t￿
￿￿
G
[￿
￿
G￿G + p￿ ￿ c]f (￿G;p￿)d￿G
which is the same as the expressions in (A4). Since all the components are identical the result
follows.
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